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Summary
Background Decisions about the continued need for control measures to contain the spread of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) rely on accurate and up-to-date information about the number of people 
testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 and risk factors for testing positive. Existing surveillance systems are generally not 
based on population samples and are not longitudinal in design.
Methods Samples were collected from individuals aged 2 years and older living in private households in England that 
were randomly selected from address lists and previous Office for National Statistics surveys in repeated cross-
sectional household surveys with additional serial sampling and longitudinal follow-up. Participants completed a 
questionnaire and did nose and throat self-swabs. The percentage of individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA 
was estimated over time by use of dynamic multilevel regression and poststratification, to account for potential 
residual non-representativeness. Potential changes in risk factors for testing positive over time were also assessed. 
The study is registered with the ISRCTN Registry, ISRCTN21086382.
Findings Between April 26 and Nov 1, 2020, results were available from 1 191 170 samples from 280 327 individuals; 5231 
samples were positive overall, from 3923 individuals. The percentage of people testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 changed 
substantially over time, with an initial decrease between April 26 and June 28, 2020, from 0·40% (95% credible interval 
0·29–0·54) to 0·06% (0·04–0·07), followed by low levels during July and August, 2020, before substantial increases at 
the end of August, 2020, with percentages testing positive above 1% from the end of October, 2020. Having a patient-
facing role and working outside your home were important risk factors for testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 at the end of 
the first wave (April 26 to June 28, 2020), but not in the second wave (from the end of August to Nov 1, 2020). Age (young 
adults, particularly those aged 17–24 years) was an important initial driver of increased positivity rates in the second 
wave. For example, the estimated percentage of individuals testing positive was more than six times higher in those 
aged 17–24 years than in those aged 70 years or older at the end of September, 2020. A substantial proportion of 
infections were in individuals not reporting symptoms around their positive test (45–68%, dependent on calendar time.
Interpretation Important risk factors for testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 varied substantially between the part of the 
first wave that was captured by the study (April to June, 2020) and the first part of the second wave of increased 
positivity rates (end of August to Nov 1, 2020), and a substantial proportion of infections were in individuals not 
reporting symptoms, indicating that continued monitoring for SARS-CoV-2 in the community will be important for 
managing the COVID-19 pandemic moving forwards.
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Introduction
Since severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) started causing severe respiratory illness 
(COVID-19) in Wuhan, China, in late 2019,1 as of 
Nov 1, 2020, there have been nearly 46 million confirmed 
cases and 1·2 million deaths reported to WHO.2 Control 
measures (eg, national lockdowns) have been widely 
implemented to contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in an 
(at least temporarily successful)3–5 attempt to prevent the 
collapse of health-care systems and even more deaths. 
Although such measures are important for control of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, they also affect the economy, 
unemployment rates, and global supply chains.6,7 Politi-
cians continuously make difficult decisions between 
continuing strict control measures or relaxing them in 
ways that would be safe enough from a public health 
perspective yet beneficial more broadly across society.8 
Importantly, early detection of population subgroups 
driving new increases in infections is crucial to 
potentially tailor interventions or messaging without 
having to implement drastic measures affecting the 
whole society.
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There are several reasons why risk factors might vary 
over time. First, behaviour and contact patterns 
of subgroups change over time without intervention 
(eg, students starting university). Adherence to non-
mandatory infection prevention measures can reduce 
more over time among subgroups with a low risk 
of COVID-19-related hospital admission and death 
than among those who are more vulnerable. Moreover, 
subgroups of people who have been disproportionally 
affected in a first wave of SARS-CoV-2 infection might 
have acquired sufficient immunity and have better access 
to effective measures that reduce the risk of infection, 
making them less likely to acquire a new infection during 
a second wave.
Here, we use data from the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) Coronavirus Infection Survey. This ongoing, large 
national survey is designed to be representative of the 
target population, offering a unique opportunity to identify 
risk factors that are driving new increases in the SARS-
CoV-2 positivity rate and investigating the proportion of 
individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 who do not 
report symptoms, the potential false-positive rate, and 
other factors that can directly inform policy around 
COVID-19-related control measures. We used Bayesian 
dynamic multilevel regression and poststratification to 
account for any residual unrepresentativeness, a potential 
problem often ignored with surveillance data.
Methods
Participants
Data were collected between April 26 and Nov 1, 2020, 
from individuals in private households randomly 
selected from address lists and previous ONS surveys 
to provide a representative sample of the population of 
England (details on sampling design in appendix p 1). 
Individuals aged 2 years and older who were living in 
private households were eligible.
The survey has been reviewed and given ethics approval 
by South Central–Berkshire B Research Ethics Committee 
(20/SC/0195).
Procedures
If one or more individuals from a household agreed to 
participate, a study worker visited the household and 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
Unprecedented control measures, such as national lockdowns, 
have been widely implemented to contain the spread of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). 
Decisions about the continued need for physical distancing 
measures in the overall population, specific subgroups, and 
geographical areas heavily rely on accurate and up-to-date 
information about the number of people infected and risk 
factors for testing positive for SARS-CoV-2. We searched PubMed 
and the medRxiv and bioRxiv preprint servers up to Nov 15, 2020, 
for epidemiological studies using the terms “SARS-CoV-2” AND 
“prevalence” OR “incidence”, without data or language 
restrictions. Most studies were small, had information about 
current presence of SARS-CoV-2 in only a few patients, or used 
data not representative of the community (eg, hospital 
admissions, deaths, or self-reported symptoms). Large 
population-based studies are needed to understand risk factors 
and dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Added value of this study
Our study is one of the largest longitudinal community 
surveys of SARS-CoV-2 infection at national and regional 
levels. With more than 1 000 000 swabs from almost 
300 000 individuals, this ongoing study provides robust 
evidence that the percentage of individuals from the general 
community in England testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 clearly 
declined between the end of April and June, 2020, followed by 
consistently low levels during July and August, 2020, before 
substantial increases at the end of August, 2020. Risk factors 
for testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 varied substantially 
between the first and second waves (April 26 to June 28, 2020, 
vs end of August to Nov 1, 2020) of higher positivity rates. 
Having a patient-facing role and working outside your home 
were important risk factors in the first wave of high positivity 
but not as of Nov 1, 2020, in the second wave, and age 
(young adults, particularly those aged 17–24 years) was an 
important driver of the second wave of increased positivity 
rates. Positive tests were reported without symptoms being 
reported in roughly half to two-thirds of cases.
Implications of all the available evidence
Our longitudinal survey showed that community supervised 
self-swabbing RT-PCR-based surveillance is achievable and 
practical. The survey could serve as a model for other countries 
and potential future pandemics. The recorded decline in the 
percentage of individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 adds 
to the increasing body of empirical evidence and theoretical 
models suggesting that the national lockdown in England, 
which was imposed on March 23, 2020, was associated—at 
least temporarily—with a decrease in infections. Important risk 
factors for testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 varied substantially 
between the first and second waves of higher positivity rates, 
and a substantial proportion of infections were in individuals 
not reporting symptoms, indicating that continued monitoring 
for SARS-CoV-2 in the community will be important for 
managing the COVID-19 pandemic moving forwards. Using 
multilevel regression and poststratification to account for 
potential residual non-representativeness of the sample, this 
survey provided early warnings that specific regions (eg, the 
North West region of England) were probably going to 
experience increases in hospital admissions and deaths.
See Online for appendix
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directly collected information from individuals about any 
symptoms (current until July 23, 2020, then in the past 
7 days before the visit) and contacts, together with 
demographic information. The study worker provided 
instructions on how to self-swab the nose and throat and 
monitored the self-swabbing, which is comparable to or 
more sensitive than swabs done by health-care workers.9 
Parents or carers took swabs from children younger than 
12 years.
Nose and throat self-swabs were couriered directly to the 
UK’s national Lighthouse laboratories (National Biocentre 
in Milton Keynes from April 26, 2020; and Glasgow from 
Aug 16, 2020) where samples were tested as part of the 
national testing programme. Identical methodology was 
used to test for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 genes for 
nucleocapsid protein (N), spike protein (S), and ORF1ab 
using RT-PCR.10 We used the TaqPath RT-PCR COVID-19 
kit (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA), which 
was analysed using UgenTec Fast Finder 3.300.5 (TagMan 
2019-nCoV assay kit V2 UK NHS ABI 7500 v2.1; UgenTec, 
Hasselt, Belgium). The assay plugin contains an assay-
specific algorithm and decision mechanism that allows 
conversion of the qualitative amplification assay PCR raw 
data from the ABI 7500 Fast into test results with little 
manual intervention. Samples are called positive in the 
presence of at least one gene (N, ORF1ab, or both) but 
could be accompanied by the gene for S protein (ie, one, 
two, or three gene positives). The gene for S protein 
is not considered a reliable single gene positive (as 
of mid-May, 2020; personal communication, National 
Biocentre, Milton Keynes, UK).
After the first visit, participants were asked whether they 
were willing to participate in further follow-up visits, 
every week for the first 5 weeks of the study then 
optional monthly visits thereafter. The study protocol and 
questionnaires are available online.
Statistical analysis
The survey was designed to test 150 000 people every 
2 weeks across England in October, 2020, to provide 
15 000–20 000 individuals in each of the nine govern-
mental office regions, giving approximately a 0·1%, 
0·2%, and 0·5% margin of error on 0·1%, 0·5%, 
and 2% prevalence, respectively.
Trend in proportion of positive tests over time
We analysed the proportion of the private-residential 
population testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 from nose 
and throat swabs over time using Bayesian dynamic 
multi level regression and poststratification.11,12 This 
method was used to correct for any residual non-
representativeness in terms of age, sex, and region. 
In several empirical and simulation studies, multilevel 
regression and poststratification was superior at both the 
national and regional levels compared with classic survey 
weighted and unweighted approaches, including when 
using small sample sizes.11–16 Partial pooling through the 
use of random effects in the multilevel model ensures 
stable estimates can be obtained for subnational levels 
from relatively small samples that would be problematic 
using more traditional survey-weighting approaches.11–16 
Multilevel regression and poststratification consists of 
two steps. First, a multilevel regression model is used to 
predict the outcome of interest as a function of (socio)
demographic and geographical variables. Second, the 
resulting outcome estimates for each demographic–
geographical respondent type are poststratified by the 
percentage of each type in the actual overall population.11
We used a Bayesian multilevel generalised additive 
regression model to model the swab test result (positive 
or negative) as a function of age, sex, time, and region. 
We did not poststratify for other factors (eg, ethnicity) 
because reliable estimates in the target population were 
not available and a model for the full period did not 
converge with ethnicity in the model (divergent 
transitions). A model including ethnicity for the most 
recent 7 weeks did converge and showed similar 
estimates and trend as did the main model (appendix 
p 9). Besides the nine regions in England, we also took 
into account that specific local authorities within regions 
(boosted areas) were purposefully oversampled at the 
end of July, 2020 (appendix p 1). Because there were very 
few missing values (≤1%) in these factors, we restricted 
all analyses to observations with non-missing data. 
A complementary log-log link was used due to the ability 
to interpret regression coefficients as arising from 
an infection process with varying levels of exposure 
(appendix p 2).17 Multilevel regression and poststratifi-
cation models with random effects for individual 
participant, household, or both nested within a region 
did not converge. Therefore, these models were run with 
only a random intercept for region (including separate 
levels for boosted areas within a region—eg, Yorkshire & 
The Humber non-boosted and Yorkshire & The Humber 
boosted), without a random intercept for participant, 
household, or both. However, a model with only one 
participant sampled from each household gave similar 
results with somewhat wider 95% credible intervals 
mainly due to the smaller sample size (appendix p 10). 
Time, measured in days since the start of the study 
(April 26, 2020), was modelled with thin-plate splines 
and allowed to vary by region. We set k, the number of 
basis functions, to 10 to control the smoothness of the 
fitted function.18 We used a normal prior with location set 
to 4 for the SD of the smooth. Very similar results were 
obtained when using different values for k or different 
priors for the SD of the smooth (appendix p 11). 
Subsequently, we poststratified the resulting positivity 
estimates for each demographic–geographical respon-
dent type by the percentage of each type in the overall 
population and in each region.
Because the effect of potential risk factors might 
change over time, and it was not feasible in terms of run 
time and available central processing unit to fit a model 
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with a much more flexible thin-plate spline for the entire 
period (April 26 to Nov 1, 2020), we also ran a multilevel 
regression and poststratification model using data for the 
most recent 7 weeks. This analysis was done with the 
rstanarm package in R, version 3.6.1.
Time-varying risk factors
To assess whether particular subgroups were more 
likely to test positive for SARS-CoV-2 during the first 
wave of increased positivity in England we did a 
multilevel regression analysis (without poststratification) 
on the data between April 26 and June 28, 2020, 
including variables on which we did not poststratify—
ie, work location, having a job that directly involved 
patients or care-home residents, ethnicity, household 
size, and number of children in the household (appendix 
p 8). In view of the short timescale included and the fact 
that questions were not always asked at every visit, we 
carried non-missing data forwards and backwards to 
adjacent visits with missing data. After this process, 
there were very few missing values (≤1%) so we again 
restricted all analyses to observations with non-missing 
data only.
We evaluated to what extent different factors were 
potentially driving recent increases in the SARS-CoV-2 
positivity rate. Since age seemed to be a strong factor in 
driving the increase, all other factors were subsequently 
stratified by age (<35 years and ≥35 years). We evaluated 
the same factors as for the first wave (to June 28, 2020) in 
generalised additive models with thin-plate splines that 
varied by each level of the factor of interest. These models 
additionally included a random intercept for region to 
account for any regional differences. Because it was not 
possible to fit all factors with these time interactions in 
one model, and in view of the limited evidence for 
confounding (appendix p 8), we fitted separate models 
for each factor of interest.
Presence of symptoms among those testing positive
To assess the number of positive tests for which 
participants reported either symptoms around the time 
of the visit (same visit, or visit before or after) or no 
symptoms around the time of the visit, we used the same 
multilevel regression and poststratification model as for 
the overall positivity rate. To assess the effect of potential 
false-positive tests, we classified each positive test into 
three categories:19 higher evidence, with two or three 
genes detected (irrespective of cycle threshold [Ct] value); 
moderate evidence, with single gene detection if the Ct 
value was less than the 97·5th percentile of higher 
evidence positives (<34) or if there was a higher pretest 
probability of infection (ie, any symptoms at or around 
the test [visit before or after] or reporting working 
in patient-facing health-care role or resident-facing 
care home role); and lower evidence, comprising all 
other positive tests, which by definition were all in 
asymptomatic individuals not having patient-facing or 
resident-facing role with a single gene detected with a 
Ct value of 34 or higher.
Role of the funding source
The funder had no role in study design, data collection, 
data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. 
All authors had access to all data reported in the study 
and accept responsibility for the decision to submit for 
publication.
Results
Between April 26 and Nov 1, 2020, results were available 
from 1 191 170 nose and throat swabs from 280 327 indi-
viduals. 5231 samples were positive overall, from 
3923 individuals in 3056 households. The study is 
ongoing and many participants were only recruited in 
October, 2020, to achieve the target sample size; 
nevertheless, the median number of visits per individual 
was four (IQR three to five, maximum 13). Of participants 
enrolled sufficiently early to have multiple study visits 
before Nov 1, 2020, most had at least five study 
visits (appendix p 5).
Characteristics of participating individuals are shown in 
the appendix (pp 6–7). Representativeness of the sample 
was visualised by plotting proportions of the sample 
within each region and age and sex category and 
comparing with known distributions for individuals 
living in private households in England (appendix p 12). 
Small under-representations and over-representations of 
some groups (eg, individuals aged 2–11 years were slightly 
under-represented) were corrected for using dynamic 
multilevel regression and poststratification, with post-
stratification done every day. SARS-CoV-2 posi tivity rates 
dropped to consistently low levels during July and 
August, 2020, before increasing substantially at the end of 
August, 2020 (figure 1). When restricting the analysis to 
the most recent 7 weeks to make the flexible spline more 
responsive to recent changes, the increase in SARS-CoV-2 
positivity rates seemed to start levelling off at the end of 
October, 2020, before the second national lockdown was 
implemented on Nov 5, 2020.
Observed patterns in SARS-CoV-2 positivity rates 
were similar between participants reporting symptoms 
and those not reporting symptoms, although in 
October, 2020, the positivity rate among those reporting 
symptoms started to increase less steeply (figure 2A). 
The modelled percentage of positive cases with 
reported symptoms around the test was lowest around 
mid-July, 2020 (32%), and highest around the beginning 
of October, 2020 (55%). The increase in SARS-CoV-2 
positivity rates starting at the end of August, 2020, was 
almost entirely due to high-evidence positive tests, 
although the levels of moderate-evidence and (to a lesser 
extent) low-evidence positive tests started to increase 
slightly in September, 2020, as well (figure 2B). People 
might have become infected with lower viral loads and 
fewer symptoms during July and August, 2020, when 
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small increases were noted in low-evidence positive 
tests and few people reported symptoms when testing 
positive, but with higher viral loads in September, 2020, 
potentially leading to a higher proportion of cases with 
symptoms. A substantial proportion (varying between 
68% in early July, 2020, to 45% in early October, 2020; 
figure 2A) of individuals who tested positive for 
SARS-CoV-2 did not report any symptoms on the day of 
the visit or at visits before or after the swab was taken.
SARS-CoV-2 positivity rates showed substantial regional 
differences, with increases in late August to October, 2020, 
largely occurring in regions in the north of England and 
(to a lesser extent) the Midlands regions (figure 1). The 
most important factor underlying the observed sharp 
increase in SARS-CoV-2 positivity was age, with earlier and 
greater increases apparent in younger adults (particularly 
those aged 17–24 years; figure 3), also shown by results 
from a model categorising age (appendix p 13). These data 
also show that near the end of October, 2020, the prevalence 
of SARS-CoV-2 positivity started to decrease in young 
adults. Importantly, clear diffusion of risk was seen from 
initial increases in younger age groups at lower risk of 
hospitalisation and death to older ages at higher risk.
Figure 1: Percentage of population living in private households testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 over time in England and the nine regions of England
Shaded areas are 95% credible intervals. The blue curve is from a model fitted on data from the entire period (April 26 to Nov 1, 2020) whereas the red curve is from a 
model fitted on data from the 7 weeks up to Nov 1, 2020. SARS-CoV-2=severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
Figure 2: Percentage of population living in private households testing positive 
for SARS-CoV-2
Plots are with and without reporting symptoms (A) and stratified by high, moderate, 
and low evidence positivity (B). Shaded areas are 95% credible intervals. 
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Although working outside their home and in patient-
facing health-care roles were clear risk factors during the 
first wave of high SARS-CoV-2 positivity that was 
captured by our study (April 26 to June 28, 2020), as was 
contact with hospitals (appendix p 8), there was no 
evidence that people working outside their home, 
working in patient-facing roles, or with hospital contact 
were driving initial increases after July and August, 2020 
(appendix pp 14–16). Non-white ethnicity was also 
associated with greater SARS-CoV-2 positivity rates 
during the first wave but not the initial increases after 
July and August, 2020 (appendix pp 17–18). Although the 
probability of testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 increased 
in all age groups after July and August, 2020, the increase 
was especially pronounced in individuals younger than 
25 years who shared a household with another person 
aged 17–24 years (appendix p 19).
Discussion
The findings of our longitudinal community survey show 
substantial changes over time in the percentage of people 
in private-residential households in England testing 
positive for SARS-CoV-2, with an initial decrease between 
April 26 and June 28, 2020, followed by consistently low 
levels during July and August, 2020, before substantial 
increases between the end of August and Nov 1, 2020. 
Our estimates have been regularly updated and shared 
with the UK Government and the Scientific Advisory 
Group for Emergencies Scientific Pandemic Influenza 
subgroup on Modelling to directly inform decisions 
about potential changes to the current alert level or 
relaxation of some restrictions. Notably, a substantial 
proportion of individuals who tested positive did not 
report any symptoms on the day of the visit or at visits 
before or after the swab was taken.
Bayesian dynamic multilevel generalised additive 
models are useful for monitoring the effect of different 
factors on SARS-CoV-2 positivity rates over time. In 
particular, these models show that the COVID-19 
pandemic restarted in young people (particularly those 
aged 17–24 years), and that factors associated with an 
increased risk of testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 during 
April to June, 2020, such as working outside the home 








































































































































































































































Figure 3: Modelled estimates (posterior medians) of the distribution of positive SARS-CoV-2 tests by age over time
Note that different scales are being used for each region. SARS-CoV-2=severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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important drivers of initial increases occurring since the 
end of August, 2020.
Although false-positive test results might be a concern 
when prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 is low, the low positivity 
for SARS-CoV-2 at the end of June, 2020 (0·05%), is also 
reassuring because it indicates that the specificity of the 
test used in the national UK programme is very high. 
A test specificity lower than 99·95% would lead to 
observed positivity rates higher than 0·05%, even in the 
purely hypothetical situation that SARS-CoV-2 was not 
circulating in June, 2020.
According to findings of a systematic review of 
population-based prevalence surveys from 19 countries,20 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, two-thirds of studies 
(n=25 [68%]) reported only antibody testing, with many of 
those studies having a high risk of bias. The few PCR-
based surveys (such as ours) were generally found to have 
a low risk of bias and, importantly, provide information 
about people currently infected and potentially able to 
transmit SARS-CoV-2.20
An important strength of our population-based study is 
that it can detect increases in the SARS-CoV-2 positivity 
rate potentially earlier and more systematically than 
can surveillance based on confirmed cases, hospital 
admissions, or deaths.21,22 This advantage of our study 
will be most useful when new increases in SARS-CoV-2 
positivity initially occur in a subgroup of the population 
at low risk of hospitalisation and death, but whose 
infections still contribute to transmission (including if 
asymptomatic),23 which was the situation after July and 
August, 2020, with the increase in positive tests among 
young adults (particularly those aged 17–24 years). The 
sharp rise in cases in this age category that started in 
August, 2020, in the North West region of England 
subsequently resulted in increases in other age groups 
and preceded an upsurge in intensive care bed occupancy 
by patients with COVID-19 in larger cities in the 
North West region, such as Manchester, where 35% of 
beds were occupied by patients with COVID-19 on 
Oct 22, 2020.24
Interpretation of changes in SARS-CoV-2 incidence and 
positivity rates from tests that are taken for contact tracing 
or clinical cases is likely to be confounded by substantial 
changes in testing practice over time. Our study is 
based on a representative sample of the population, with 
further correction for residual non-representativeness 
using multilevel regression and poststratification, thereby 
preventing difficulties with interpretation due to changes 
in testing practice.
A few other studies have aimed to assess the prevalence 
of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the general population. 
A repeated cross-sectional population-based study from 
England also found a similar decline in the prevalence of 
SARS-CoV-2 among the general population between May 1 
and June 1, 2020;25 another cross-section from that study 
showed an increase in prevalence in September, 2020.26 
Among individuals who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 
in that study, the percentage reporting no symptoms 
varied between 50% and 81% in different cross-sections.26 
A study from Vo’,27 an Italian town with a population of 
3275 indi viduals, reported the percentage of people who 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 who did not report any 
symptoms was 41·0–44·8%.27 In a larger study from 
Iceland,28 participants were recruited via an open invitation, 
which could bias the sample towards people with 
symptoms. 57% of individuals in that study who tested 
positive for SARS-CoV-2 reported having symptoms, 
although 29% of individuals testing negative also reported 
having symptoms.28 A meta-analysis of studies focusing on 
close contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases suggested 
that only 17% (95% CI 14–20) of infected individuals are 
asymptom atic.29 However, informing people that they were 
recently in close contact with a confirmed COVID-19 
case can result in recall bias and overestimate the true 
prevalence of symptoms among a representative sample of 
infected people. Although we might have underestimated 
the true prevalence of symptoms among people with 
SARS-CoV-2 infection in the community, partly due to 
asking about current symptoms at visits up to July 23, 2020 
(meaning that very transient symptoms only occurring 
between visits would have been missed), and symptoms in 
the past 7 days thereafter, our study adds to the growing 
evidence that a substantial proportion of SARS-CoV-2 in 
the community could be asymptomatic.30–32
Our survey shows that community supervised self-
swabbing RT-PCR-based surveillance is achievable and 
practical. Community surveillance facilitates early 
detection of changes in the COVID-19 pandemic that are 
not driven by changes in testing, estimation of prevalence 
and incidence, evaluation of time-varying risk factors of 
testing positive for SARS-CoV-2, and changes in viral 
burden.19 Our survey could serve as a model for other 
countries and future pandemics.
An important limitation of our study is that the number 
of people in the community who test positive is low, 
limiting power and leading to relatively large uncertainty 
around estimates, and meaning that our multilevel 
regression model was not able to incorporate likely 
correlation within households. However, sensitivity 
analyses suggested that within-household clustering did 
not have a large effect on our results and, assuming the 
households we sampled are representative of households 
in general, our estimates should still reflect SARS-CoV-2 
positivity rates in the target population as a whole.
Another limitation of our study is that, although we 
adjusted for potential non-representativeness in terms 
of age, sex, and region, there could be other factors for 
which we did not have detailed information about 
population distributions, which are also associated 
with testing positive for SARS-CoV-2. For example, 
people with non-white ethnicity were modestly under-
represented in our survey, potentially underestimating 
the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2. Furthermore, associ-
ations (or, lack of associations) with testing positive for 
For the latest data from the UK 
Government on COVID-19 see 
https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk
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SARS-CoV-2 could be due to residual confounding. We 
did forwards and backwards imputation for missing 
data, reflecting the relatively short timescales of the 
study.
A third limitation is that, in the absence of a true gold 
standard, we do not know the sensitivity and specificity 
of the PCR test, making assessment of the true 
prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 difficult. However, the true 
specificity is likely to be very close to 100%. These data 
cannot inform about test sensitivity without pro viding a 
very informative prior on the true prevalence.33 Although 
self-swabbing was monitored by study workers and is 
used very widely, this procedure could still lead to 
underestimates of prevalence of SARS-CoV-2. However, 
use of self-swabbing should not affect trends over time.
In a rapidly evolving epidemic, during which ongoing 
surveillance is essential to guide public health response, 
Bayesian dynamic multilevel regression and post strati-
fication is a powerful method to ensure population-
representative estimates can be obtained. Specifically, our 
model showed that the percen tage of individuals from the 
community in England testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 
declined between April 26 and June 28, 2020, and 
remained stable for much of July and August, 2020, before 
increasing again from the end of August to October, 2020. 
Important risk factors for testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 
varied substantially between the first and second waves of 
higher positivity rates, and a substantial proportion of 
SARS-CoV-2 infections were in individuals not reporting 
symptoms, indicating that continued monitoring for 
SARS-CoV-2 in the community will be important for 
managing the pandemic moving forwards.
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